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SHAPING WORLD AVIATION: ANGLO-AMERICAN
CIVIL AVIATION RELATIONS, 1944-1946
MARC L.J. DIERIKX*
M UCH HAS BEEN written about the contents and im-
plications of the Chicago Convention and the 1946
Bermuda-I Agreement. Little is known, however, about
the process that led up to these major aviation agree-
ments. Until recent years, historical research has been
hampered by legal restrictions limiting access to govern-
ment records. Based on previously unstudied documents,
this article discusses the Anglo-American differences un-
derlying the Chicago Convention and the Bermuda-I
Agreement.
I. INTRODUCTION
The basic positions held by Great Britain and the
United States toward post-war international civil aviation
are well known. In popular terminology, the British posi-
tion was one of protectionism while the United States sup-
ported an open skies approach. These positions stemmed
largely from the different aircraft production capability of
the United States and Britain in the years following 1941.
An agreement was reached between the two countries that
Great Britain should concentrate its manufacturing capa-
bility on fighting aircraft, and the United States, with its
* Dr. Dierikx holds a post at the History Department of the Catholic University
of Nijmegen (Netherlands) under a research fellowship of the Royal Netherlands
Academy of Arts and Sciences and is a Visiting Research Associate to the London
School of Economics. The research for this article was made possible by a grant
from the Niels Stensen Foundation in 1988-89.
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far larger aircraft industry, would supply both countries
with the transport planes necessary for the war.' A closer
look, however, reveals that much more was at stake. Both
countries' views toward civil aviation had changed dra-
matically compared to their official pre-war policies. In
1919, Great Britain vainly tried to persuade the Versailles
Peace Conference to adopt a liberal attitude with regard
to rights for international air services in the Paris Conven-
tion on International Civil Aviation (the Paris Conven-
tion). Liberalism in aviation was rejected, however, by the
majority of countries present. Instead, article 15 of the
Paris Convention stated: "the establishment of interna-
tional airways shall be subject to the consent of the states
flown over."' 2 Aeronautical developments of the next ten
years, however, convinced Great Britain that the restric-
tive approach of article 15 was the best way to ensure con-
trol over the operations of foreign airlines. Restriction of
this kind was seen to be the best method of protecting
Great Britain's national carrier, Imperial Airways, from
being outclassed by foreign competition such as the
Dutch carrier, KLM, on the prestigious air routes to colo-
nial territories.
Although the United Kingdom continued to express a
liberal approach to international civil aviation, this liber-
alism was aimed exclusively toward the maintenance of
British aerial superiority. What Great Britain presented
as liberalism on occasions such as the Paris International
Civil Aviation Conference in June of 1929 was, in fact, a
calculated position assumed to avoid blame for any fur-
ther curtailment of international air transport. London in
fact welcomed the Paris Conference's rejection of a more
I Telegram from Winston Churchill to Franklin Roosevelt (Nov. 28, 1944) in
ROOSEVELT & CHURCHILL: THEIR SECRET WARTIME CORRESPONDENCE, doc. 468,
608-11 (F.L. Loewnheim et al. eds., 1975) [hereinafter ROOSEVELT & CHURCHILL].
2 1 INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION: A COLLECTION OF TEXTS OF MULTI-PARTITE IN-
TERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS OF GENERAL INTEREST 1919-1921, 359-76 (Manley 0.
Hudson ed., 1931) (full text of Paris Convention) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL
LEGISLATION].
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liberal approach to international civil aviation with secret
cheers:
We are now in a very strong position as regards art. 15,
because, although we have pleaded for liberty, all the Eu-
ropean nations, except Holland and Sweden, have voted
against us. This can be borne in mind when negotiating
with the French [and the Dutch] regarding the passage
over India.3
In the following years, Britain quietly stopped foreign
competition whenever possible. The Dutch were the main
victims. Their projected direct air service from Holland
to Australia (through the Dutch East Indies) never materi-
alized because of British opposition. Britain continued,
however, to officially favor liberalism in the air.
In the United States, the attitude toward international
aviation was different in appearance rather than in fact. In
1920 the Senate chose not to ratify the Paris Convention
because of its links with the Versailles Peace Treaty and
the League of Nations.4 Thereafter, the Atlantic formed
both a physical and legal barrier between civil aeronautics
in Europe and the United States.
Until 1927, civil aviation in the United States was con-
fined to internal postal services. Only in March, 1928, did
Congress finally approve the Foreign Air Mail Act,5 aimed
at establishing a network of American air services to the
Caribbean and South America. The commencement of
international flights necessitated a legal regime covering
3 Memorandum by Sir William Sefton Brancker, Director of Civil Aviation (June
17, 1929) (on file with British Public Record Office (London), Air Ministry Papers
(AM), AVIA 2, 1863) (added to the file of the Conference on International Air
Navigation of June 1929 on June 17, 1929 for the purpose of amending the 1919
Paris Convention).
4 3 INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION, supra note 2, at 2354-69. The Paris Conven-
tion was the first general convention concerning aerial navigation, but individual
provisions on aerial navigation involving Germany were included in Part XI of the
Versailles Peace Treaty. 225 CLIVE PARRY, THE CONSOLIDATED TREATY SERIES
195, 195-205, 350 (1981) (contains the text of the Versailles Peace Treaty signed
onJune 28, 1919).
.1 Foreign Air Mail Act, ch. 149, 45 Stat. 248 (1928), repealed by Air Mail Act of
1938, ch. 607, § 1107(k), 52 Stat. 1029.
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such operations. This need formed the backdrop of the
sixth conference of the Pan American Union, held in Ha-
vana in February of 1928, which adopted the Pan Ameri-
can Convention on Commercial Aviation.6 At first glance,
the Convention appeared to provide a liberal basis for in-
ternational aviation in the Western hemisphere.7 Article
4 granted a general right of innocent passage to the air-
craft of contracting states and did not contain restrictions
such as article 15 of the Paris Convention.8 Moreover, ar-
ticle 30 stipulated that none of the contracting states
would obstruct the establishment of regular international
air services. 9 The central clause of interest here, however,
is the lengthy and loosely formulated article 21:
The aircraft of a contracting State engaged in interna-
tional air commerce shall be permitted to discharge pas-
sengers and a part of its cargo at one of the airports
designated as a port of entry of any other contracting
State, and to proceed to any other airport or airports in
such States for the purpose of discharging the remaining
passengers and portions of such cargo and in like manner
take on passengers and load cargo destined for a foreign
State or States, provided that they comply with the legal
requirements of the country over which they fly, which
legal requirements shall be the same for native and for-
eign aircraft engaged in international traffic and shall be
communicated in due course to the contracting States and
to the Pan American Union.' 0
The United States interpreted article 21 to require that
both national airlines and airlines of foreign contracting
states obtain prior Commerce Commission permission to
engage in any kind of air traffic to or from the United
6 Pan-American Convention on Commercial Aviation, Feb. 20, 1928, 129 L. N. T S. 223,
reprinted in I INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION, supra note 2, at 2354-69 [hereinafter
Pan-American Convention].
7Id.
8 Id.; see 1 INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION, supra note 2, at 359-76.
9 Pan-American Convention, supra note 6.
10 Id. art. 21, reprinted in, 3 INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION, supra note 2, at 2354-
69.
SHAPING WORLD AVIATION
States."l In practice, this meant that, notwithstanding the
free trade policy of Roosevelt's Secretary of State Cordell
Hull, only one foreign airline (Britain's Imperial Airways)
was granted landing rights in the United States prior to
the outbreak of the Second World War. Imperial's land-
ing rights were provided for in an Anglo-American bilat-
eral agreement executed in 1935.12 Progressing from the
basic principles of the agreement to the operating permits
deemed necessary for actual operations, however, took
two more years. Restrictive attitudes and prestige-con-
sciousness on both sides of the Atlantic revealed them-
selves in the central clause of the permits, which stated
that service should not commence unless and until both
airline companies involved, Pan American Airways (Pan
Am) and Imperial Airways (restructured as the British
Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC) in April of 1940),
declared themselves ready for scheduled transatlantic
flights. '3
II. WARTIME PLANS
Allied cooperation during the war required that the re-
strictive prewar regime be loosened. As a result, the
United States and Britain concluded a so-called no-exclu-
sion agreement 14 in an exchange of notes between
Cordell Hull and the British ambassador to Washington,
Lord Halifax, in July 1942 under which, as one British
source summarized, "neither we nor the United States
Government, nor companies acting for either of us, will
set up arrangements which have the effect of denying
landing or traffic rights to United States and British com-
I See NICOLAS M. MATTE, TREATISE ON AIR-AERONAUTICAL LAw 121 n.8 (1981).
12 Arrangement Relating to Air Navigation, Mar. 28 - Apr. 5, 1935, U.S.-U.K.,
L.N.T.S. 3733 at 39.
I., Imperial Airways Operating Permit, issued by the U.S. Government, Apr. 17,
1937, in Public Record Office [hereinafter PRO], AM, AVIA 2, 2808.
11 See ALAN P. DOBSON, PEACEFUL AIR WARFARE: THE UNITED STATES, BRITAIN
AND THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL AVIATION 127-30 (1991).
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panies in any part of the world."' 5
The British were not happy with this expression of An-
glo-American cooperation because of the threat that the
no-exclusion agreement posed to BOAC's postwar posi-
tion in international civil aviation. In December 1943, the
War Cabinet Committee on Post-War Civil Air Transport,
in keeping with pre-war practice, advised the government
to terminate the agreement at the end of the war in order
to protect BOAC's interests. Great Britain could then
enter into fresh bilateral negotiations with the United
States.' 6 BOAC, however, had plans of its own and was
convinced that "the best and perhaps the only way of
maintaining the position of British air transport after or
even during the later stages of this war" was to unite with
commonwealth countries.' 7 BOAC prepared a proposal
for the formation of a Commonwealth Air Corporation
which would present a united front against the expected
economic surprise attack by United States airlines on the
post war international air transport market. The plan re-
ceived the backing of both Winston Churchill and Max
Beaverbrook, Minister of Aircraft Production. Of the do-
minions, however, only New Zealand and India were pre-
pared to go along with this proposal. Canada, South
Africa, and Australia strongly opposed the plan. These
countries saw the Commonwealth Air Corporation propo-
sal as potential infringement on their emerging national
pride. As a result of Pan Am's perceived competitive
abuses, however, the call for postwar protective measures
in Britain only grew stronger. In the same year, Pan Am
jumped at the opportunity to increase transatlantic flights
15 Minutes of the 10th meeting of the Committee on Post-War Civil Air Trans-
port, Dec. 12, 1943, in PRO, Foreign Office [hereinafter FO] 371, 42,552.
16 Indeed, both countries would agree to terminate the no-exclusion agreement
the moment they were to become bound by the international agreement on the
subject. Telegram from the British Embassy in Washington, D.C. to the Foreign
Office (Apr. 22, 1945) (PRO, 371, F0371, 50243).
17 Letter from Walter Runciman, President of the Board of Trade, to J.W.S.
Brancker, Jr., BOAC agent in Lagos (June 7, 1942) (PRO, RAF-Museum depot
(Hendon), BOAC papers, AW 1, 3763).
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from twice to three times weekly while a war-struck BOAC
was forced to reduce services.
The United States was meanwhile moving toward a
more liberal position. On May 4, 1943, the Civil Aviation
Board (CAB) issued a questionnaire to all United States
airlines in an attempt to gather their views on post-war
civil aviation. This questionaire was intended to assist in
the clarification of the United States international aviation
policy. In response, however, sixteen United States air-
lines issued a joint statement on June, 15, 1943, that re-
jected Pan Am's monopoly on international operations.
The airlines' declaration was then adopted by the Interde-
partmental Committee on Civil Aviation which recom-
mended active government involvement in international
civil aviation.18 The final position advocated that a multi-
lateral agreement be sought in order to obtain general
rights of transit and technical landings.' 9 At the same
time, although less explicitly, it became clear from the
declaration that the Pan Am monopoly, closely guarded
by its chief executive Juan T. Trippe, would not be contin-
ued after the war. °
Roosevelt, no friend of Trippe's to begin with, agreed
that the Pan Am monopoly should be abolished in the
post-war period and firmly stated his intention of ending
Pan Am's unique position.2  Although Roosevelt admit-
ted that Pan Am must be given proper credit for its pio-
neering efforts (perhaps the cream of the business), he
was not inclined to award all post-war business to
Trippe.2 2 In the President's view, the world would be di-
vided into zones for American airline operations.23 Each
"I Memorandum from the Interdepartmental Committee on International Avia-
tion Regarding International Civil Aviation, as revised and adopted Aug. 26, 1943
(Aug. 31, 1943) (on file with Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library [hereinaf-
ter FDR-LIB], Hyde Park, NY, PSF 116).
1' Id.
20 Id.
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zone would then be operated by one of several independ-
ent American companies.2 4 These airlines were to be pri-
vate enterprises.25
Roosevelt's plans for civil aviation, however, went fur-
ther than opposition to a Pam Am monopoly and favored
a free exchange of landing rights: "[Roosevelt] wanted ar-
rangements by which planes of one country could enter
any other country for the purpose of discharging traffic of
foreign origin and accepting foreign bound traffic" while
reserving cabotage for the national carriers.26 Only Gen-
eral H.H. (Hap) Arnold, commanding General of the
United States Army Air Force and an ardent supporter of
liberalism in the air, was prepared to support Roosevelt in
this position. In a memorandum to the President on
March 26, 1944, Arnold stressed the importance of inter-
national civil aviation.27 He was convinced that liberalized
international civil aviation would be beneficial to the
maintenance of a strong aviation industry in the United
States.28
In spite of these liberal voices, the furthering of United
States interests in international civil aviation through
postwar protectionism remained the foremost American
goal. A special CAB report to Roosevelt revealed the bot-
tom line of United States policy:
The United States should grant to foreign air carriers op-
erating rights involving the taking on and discharge of
traffic only where the extension of that privilege is re-
quired in order to permit the establishment of air services
by United States carriers, the inauguration of which is re-
quired by our national interest.29
24 Id.
25 Id.
2 Memorandum of conversation with Franklin Roosevelt by Adolph Berle, As-
sistant Secretary of State (Nov. 11, 1943) (on file with FDR-LIB, PSF 116).
27 Secret Memorandum from General H.H. Arnold, Commanding General,
U.S. Army Air Force to Franklin Roosevelt (Mar. 26, 1944) (on file with FDR-LIB,
PSF 116).
28 Id.
29 Special Report of the Civil Aeronautics Board, International Air Transport Policy
(Apr. 12, 1944) (on file with FDR-LIB, Personal Secretary File, Aviation).
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In practice, the CAB encouraged United States airlines to
take over international air routes wherever and whenever
the Military Air Transport Command ended its wartime
operations. In this manner, the development of foreign
airline competition could be effectively precluded. This
approach was endorsed by the influential Senate Commit-
tee on Commerce which was bent upon retaining full sov-
ereign control over United States airspace and continuing
the all-American air policy conducted so far.3 0
In the British camp, straightforward protectionism was
giving way to ideas aimed at putting aviation on an inter-
national regulatory footing. In the wake of the plans for a
Commonwealth Air Corporation, the Commonwealth
Conference on Civil Aviation agreed on four general
points in October 1943:
1. To set up an effective machinery to ensure the mainte-
nance of broad equilibrium between air transport capacity
and the traffic offering.
2. To provide for equitable participation by the various
countries joining in international air transport.
3. To eliminate uneconomic competition by control of
subsidies, thereby making air transport self-supporting
wherever possible.
4. The United Kingdom considered that frequencies and
quotas of operation could be controlled internationally on
international air routes, and that these frequencies should
be divided in the form of quotas based on the traffic inter-
est principle among nations entitled to operate on the
routes.3 1
The concept of the four freedoms of the air was also put
forward for the first time. 2
Two sets of basic principles resulted: the Canadian and
'0 Letter from L. Welch Pogue, CAB Chairman to Josiah W. Bailey (May 26,
1944)(on file with U.S. National Archives, Washington, D.C. [hereinafter NA]
Committees on Commerce, SEN 78A-F, 111); Letter from Josiah W. Bailey &
Bennett Champ Clark to Franklin Roosevelt (Aug. 19, 1944) (on file with NA,
Committee on Commerce, SEN 79A-F6, 104).
31 Peter Masefield, Summary of the British Position Regarding International
Civil Aviation (June 20, 1944) (on file with PRO, AM, AVIA2, 2255).
U2 Id.
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the Australian/New Zealand approach. Canada proposed
a new convention on international civil aviation in opposi-
tion to the plan for Commonwealth Air Corporation in
January of 1944. 33 The Canadian plan centered around
an International Air Transport Authority that would regu-
late international civil aviation entirely. The goal of the
International Air Transport Authority would be "to meet
the needs of the peoples of the world for efficient and eco-
nomic air transport and to ensure that, so far as possible,
international air routes and services were divided fairly
and equally between the various member states. 34
Within this essentially political set-up, civil aviation was to
be free. The Canadian plan was quickly adopted by Great
Britain and, in early February of 1944, the War Cabinet
Committee on Post-War Civil Air Transport was estab-
lished to study the implications of the Canadian propos-
als. A month later, Australia and New Zealand developed
a plan that went even further. Convening in Canberra,
the two dominions proposed a scheme that would result
in the internationalization of all non-domestic air
routes.3
Expanding on such plans, the Foreign Office offered
the United States the use of British air bases for commer-
cial purposes as a bargaining chip in order to reach an
agreement with Washington on an international civil avia-
tion convention that would safeguard British interests.
Britain expected these new proposals to prevent the
United States from using their "infinitely greater competi-
tive efficiency," reasoning that otherwise "it might be im-
possible for us to retrieve our position. 36
33 Canadian draft for a New International Convention on Civil Aviation (Jan. 8,
1944) (on file with PRO, Ministry of Civil Aviation [MCA] Papers, BT 245, 912).
34 Id.
35 As a result of strong U.S. and Soviet opposition, the Australian Government
withdrew the plan in September of 1944 in order to support the previously pro-
posed alternative of establishing a Commonwealth Air Corporation. Telegram
from Australian government to British Foreign Office (Sept. 26, 1944) (on file
with PRO, FO 371, 42,572).
36 Letter from Richard Law, Foreign Office, to Max Beaverbrook, British Minis-
ter of Aircraft Production (Mar. 22, 1944) (on file with PRO, FO, F0371, 42,558).
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British efforts to gain United States support for an ef-
fective machinery to regulate transport capacity offering
and ensure control of subsidies preventing uneconomic
competition were in vain. In early April of 1944, civil avi-
ation discussions between the British and United States
delegations produced only an agreement to draft and sign
a new international convention on aerial navigation.
This convention would be administered by an interna-
tional authority that would make provisions for interna-
tional regulation of the technical field.3 8 Beaverbrook,
however, continued to voice concerns about the future of
post-war British aviation. These concerns were shared by
Air Minister Archibald Sinclair. For Sinclair, BOAC was
much more than a body conducting air services: "[BOAC
is] capable of maintaining and developing the prestige of
this country in the air. ... Moreover, it is already evident
that many services will be required after the war, which
would not be justified by the ordinary criteria of a com-
mercial carrier. ' 93 9
In London there was a widespread belief that the
United States intended to gain outright domination in air
transport after the war. These concerns were fed by
United States policy in the months prior to the Chicago
conference. The United States approached Spain with a
request for landing rights in early August of 1944. To the
British, a bilateral agreement between the United States
and Spain was an unsettling prospect: the United States
had both the planes and the pilots to begin commercial
operations between the two countries immediately after
the signing of an armistice agreement in Europe. The
British feared that the United States would conclude bilat-
eral agreements with a number of key countries in Europe
in the near future and gain a post-war advantage. Wide
37 Summary of Informal Discussion on Civil Aviation Between the United King-
dom and the United States, Apr. 3-7, 1944 (Apr. 9, 1944) (on file with PRO, FO,
371, 42,559).
38 Id.
3' Memorandum by Archibald Sinclair, British Secretary of State for Air, on the
Future of BOAC (May 27, 1944) (on file with PRO, FO, 371, 42,562).
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support from the smaller European countries for an inter-
national regulatory body would thus be precluded.
London therefore, attempted to pressure Spain into de-
laying the grant of aviation rights to the United States un-
til after conceding similar rights to BOAC for which
BOAC had a long-standing application. To strengthen
the British position, the War Cabinet decided to acceler-
ate the development of new civil aircraft and to begin
their production as soon as possible. Great Britain also
approached France and the Soviet Union to gain support
for its position on the regulation of international air
transport.4 °
On October 8, 1944, a White Paper, outlining the Brit-
ish position, appeared in the form of Command Paper
6561.41 It contained an assessment of pre-war civil avia-
tion based on the premise that because pre-war aviation
had been political, rather than economic, the orderly de-
velopment of world communications had been impeded
to the extent that any country could hold the operators of
another country at ransom. 42 Bargaining for commercial
and transit rights gave rise to international conflicts and
no means of controlling heavy subsidization of airlines ex-
isted.43 The Command Paper then presented the British
position on post-war civil aviation.44 It called for interna-
tional cooperation to
meet the needs for the peoples of the world for plentiful,
efficient and cheap air services; maintain broad equilib-
rium between the world's air transport capacity and the
traffic offering; ensure equitable participation by the vari-
ous countries engaged in international air transport; elimi-
nate wasteful competitive practices and, in particular, to
control subsidies; standardize practice on technical mat-
ters important to the safety of flying; in general contribute
40 Memoranda by Archibald Sinclair, British Secretary of State for Air (Aug. 16,
Sept. 18, 1944) (on file with PRO, MCA, BT 245,913).






A new international convention on civil aviation was to
be prepared to reflect these goals and to define anew the
sovereignty principle and the freedoms that international
air transport should enjoy within the limits of this doc-
trine.4 6 The Command Paper proposed that an Interna-
tional Air Authority with supra-national powers be
established to execute the new convention.47 The Inter-
national Air Authority would determine and distribute
frequencies, fix rates of carriage, and establish safety
standards.48
Great Britain failed to reach full agreement with the do-
minion governments on these issues at the Common-
wealth Air Conversations held in Montreal on October
23-26 of 1944 because of Canadian reservations regard-
ing the British plea for immediate and rigid control of fre-
quencies. London then instructed its delegation to the
Chicago conference to make a strong effort to secure the
agreement of the United States and other delegates to a
convention to address the control of frequencies, quotas,
rates, and technical matters along the lines set out in the
recent White Paper. If this proved to be impossible, the
British delegates were directed to attempt to secure a bi-
lateral convention with the United States covering techni-
cal matters such as safety regulations. Frequencies,
quotas, and rates would then be set through bilateral
49negotiations.
The reasoning behind the British position was appar-
ent. London feared the United States and indeed all for-
eign competition in air transport and realized that its
technologically backward aviation industry was unable to
produce competitive aircraft. Great Britain, therefore,
45 Id.
46 Air Ministry, 1944, Cmd. 6561, supra note 41.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Telegram from the Foreign Office in London to the British Embassy in
Washington, D.C. (Oct. 28, 1944) (on file with PRO, FO, 371, 42,577).
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had no other option than to press for an international reg-
ulatory body that would divide major air routes along
political lines. This division would, by giving an equal
share of air routes to the airlines of the world's leading
powers, limit and control competition among the airlines
of the various countries.
III. CHICAGO COMPROMISE
The Chicago conference opened on November 1, 1944.
In his introductory speech, the head of the United States
delegation, Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle, made
it clear that the United States would under no circum-
stances accept British proposals for an international regu-
latory body.5 Instead, Berle made a strong argument
that the four freedoms should be accepted forthwith by
the countries present as the basis for post-war civil avia-
tion.5' In a personal letter to Roosevelt, he complained:
Before doing anything else, I invited Lord Swinton, Chair-
man of the British Delegation, to lunch. After the usual
courtesies, Lord Swinton spoke of the White Paper as the
unchangeable British position. I pointed out that this
White Paper was merely a restatement of the British posi-
tion as given to Dr. Warner and myself by Lord Beaver-
brook in London in April 1944 in preparatory discussion.
We had then made it clear that such a position was sub-
stantially impossible of acceptance, since it amounted to
mere blanket delegation of power to an international body
with no knowledge of what this body was designed to do.
We had asked for clarification of the British position which
we had not got.
Lord Swinton then stated that the British desire was that
they should have roughly one half of the Atlantic traffic,
and that in general they felt that United States lines should
not play any great part beyond the Atlantic gateways.
"Did you really think we were going to change our
minds?" he asked. The general conception appeared to
-0 Adoph Berle, Assistant U.S. Secretary of State, Address at the Chicago Con-




be that American aviation had no particular reason to exist
on the continent of Europe, Africa and Asia, beyond the
seacoast.
I observed that as far as I could see the British Govern-
ment was asking not merely for United States money and
for United States planes, but likewise for United States
traffic to put in her planes.5 2
The talks thus began with serious differences of opinion
between the two leading allied powers. Personal dislike
between Berle and Swinton only exacerbated this basic
disagreement. In Berle's eyes, Swinton had trouble
grasping the very essence of future aeronautical develop-
ment.53 It is clear from Berle's comments on Swinton that
Berle did not regard his British counterpart highly:
he tends to be arrogant and inflexible, not having quite
appreciated the difference between the atmosphere of the
coast of the Gulf of Guinea and that of the shores of Lake
Michigan. Most of his European colleagues are in despair
about it; but publicly the relations are in a basis of com-
plete and almost exaggerated courtesy and cooperation.54
Berle's original optimism that the United States domi-
nated conference55 could be concluded quickly, waned
fast. It became clear at an early stage that the British plea
for international regulation was not without supporters.
France, Belgium, Norway, Portugal, and Turkey heartily
agreed with London on the need to stem competition. 6
Berle underestimated this support. On November 6,
52 Letter from Adolf Berle, Assistant U.S. Secretary of State, to Franklin
Roosevelt, President of the United States (Dec. 7, 1944) (on file with the FDR-
LIB, Berle Papers at 60).
51 Letter from Adolf Berle, Assistant U.S. Secretary of State, to Max Beaver-
brook, British Minister of Aircraft Production (Dec. 30, 1944) (on file with the
FDR-LIB, Berle Papers at 59).
- B.B. BERLE & T.B. JACOBS, NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS 1918-1971: FROM THE
PAPERS OF A.A. BERLE 503 (1978) (diary file Nov. 26, 1944) [hereinafter BERLE &
JACOBS].
5- During the opening Session of the conference, the delegates even rose to
sing the Star Spangled Banner.
56 Telegram from Lord Swinton, Chairman of the British Delegation to the Chi-
cago Convention to Sir Edward Bridges, Secretary of the War Cabinet, (Nov. 4,
1944) (on file with PRO, F0371, 42,580).
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Berle still believed that the conference could be con-
cluded in a "ghastly ten days of agreeing on texts."' 57 The
question of fifth freedom rights, however, turned out to
be a much greater stumbling block than Berle anticipated.
The approaches of Great Britain and the United States
to fifth freedom rights were fundamentally different. Brit-
ain regarded all air traffic as point to point services be-
tween final destinations, in accordance with London's
desire that United States airlines not play any great part
beyond the Atlantic gateways. The United States posi-
tion, on the other hand, was that the fifth freedom rights
should be treated as international traffic between any in-
termediate points en route which were necessary to make
a given route economically viable by maintaining load fac-
tors high enough to ensure profitable operations.5 8
These positions may be summarized as politics versus
commercialism. The point to point concept was consis-
tent with Great Britain's support for an international reg-
ulatory body as an internationally acceptable division of
frequencies and capacity would clearly be easier to arrive
at if all traffic were point to point. The British thus tried
to muster support for their view of fifth freedom as mean-
ing traffic from the country of origin to non-final points
on a given air route (e.g., New York-Athens on an air
route New York-Cairo) and back again. The only practical
difference between this view of fifth freedom traffic and
third and fourth freedom traffic was that fifth freedom
traffic would be combined on a plane carrying third and
fourth freedom passengers. It took the United States
nearly two weeks to persuade Swinton's delegation to
agree to the United States interpretation.
Berle encountered other problems as well. He was
faced with internal opposition in the American delega-
.11 BERLE &JACOBS, supra note 54, 500-01 (diary file Nov. 6-9, 1944).
.1 See generally Bin Cheng, Beyond Bermuda, in INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT;
LAW, ORGANIZATION AND POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 81 (Nicholas M. Matte ed.,
1976); RICHARD Y. CHUANG, THE INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION: A
CASE STUDY OF A QUASi-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION (1972).
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tion. Senator Owen Brewster, so close an ally of Juan
Trippe's that he was nicknamed "the Senator from
PanAm," continuously leaked confidential information to
the press. PanAm believed that the United States position
on liberalization ran counter to its position of sole chosen
instrument.5 9 Brewster, PanAm, and Chicago Tribune re-
porter Sam Pryor acted together in an attempt to
destabilize support for the liberalization of international
aviation.60
Due to these underlying differences, the delegates did
not reach agreement on the first four freedoms of the air,
and the capacity problems connected with them, until No-
vember 17. In the end, through the efforts of a stubborn
Swinton, the British delegation got its way on capacity.
Capacity was allocated to each country on a traffic em-
barked basis. Swinton and Berle also agreed to regulate
fares to prevent undercutting and unfair subsidies. 6' The
issue of fifth freedom traffic (the traffic between any two
countries on a given air route) entered the negotiations
on November 18. Great Britain agreed to the United
States' definition of fifth freedom for economic operating
purposes after extended disussions because of the British
desire to limit fifth freedom rights.
Berle then proposed what he viewed as the logical next
step in regard to fifth freedom traffic. Berle recalled that:
We had insisted that in this regard traffic should find its
natural level, and while we were content to accept a start-
ing quota, if additional traffic offered, the line should have
the right to increase its frequencies through the process of
"escalation" - adding additional planes when planes were
running at 65% load factor, which in operating language
means substantially full. 62
Berle's proposal encountered stiff opposition from Great
.11 BERLE &JACOBS, supra note 54, at 503 (diary file Nov. 26, 1944).
0 Id.
61 Telegram from Winston Churchill to Franklin Roosevelt (Nov. 28, 1944), in
ROOSEVELT & CHURCHILL, supra note 1, at 609.
62 BERLE &JACOBS, supra note 54, at 503-05 (diary file Nov. 26, 1944).
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Britain. The British delegation vigorously objected to the
insertion of an escalator clause on fifth freedom rights,
which they felt that they had already been forced to accept
in regard to third and fourth freedom traffic. The United
States viewed this opposition as a radical change in Brit-
ain's position and attributed it to news from London. The
British countered that the controversy was due to the
United States delegation's misunderstanding of the Brit-
ish position.
A crisis developed at this stage. Roosevelt strongly pro-
tested the British interpretation of fifth freedom rights in
a telegram to Churchill.6 3 According to Roosevelt, refusal
to allow an escalation clause would stifle the development
of air transport.6 Roosevelt attempted to persuade
Churchill by asserting that the restriction of air transport
would not be beneficial to the British.65  He urged
Churchill to tell his delegates to accept some sort of
compromise.6 6
Matters came to a head on November 27. The confer-
ence convened in a closed session to discuss the differing
positions of the United States and Great Britain. The
British delegates maintained their earlier stand and stated
that their postion was in the interest of smaller countries
because it would allow each country equal rights of access
to the air traffic market. As the various delegations made
their speeches it became apparent that the British position
carried very little support. Only the French and Austra-
lian delegations were unequivocal in their adhesion to
British definitions of fifth freedom rights.67
Irritated by Berle's November 18th introduction of the
escalation clause, Churchill sent a telegram to Roosevelt
in which he wrote:
63 Telegram from Franklin Roosevelt to Winston Churchill (Nov. 21, 1944), in




BERLE & JACOBS, supra note 54, at 505.06 (diary file Nov. 27, 1944).
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a combination of the escalator clause and the fifth freedom
* . . would enable American aircraft to carry most of the
traffic between the United Kingdom and the Dominions
and India and all foreign countries, as well as between all
nations of the Commonwealth. It would, in fact, give the
United States airlines the right to everything save
cabotage.68
Churchill strongly urged Roosevelt to reconsider and ac-
cept the British position on the five freedoms.69 Churchill
concluded that the effect of agreements reached earlier in
the war dividing industrial production of aircraft was that
the United States was ready for "a flying start," whereas
Great Britain and other countries were not.7 °
The conference now threatened to grind to a halt, hav-
ing reached the ultimate point to which the British were
prepared to go. In order to bypass British obstructionism
the United States delegation then proposed
a simple plan under which each of the parties granted to
the other all five freedoms, subject to a general right of
the proposed Council and assembly of the Organization to
listen to complaints, examine them and hold consultations
thereon; and in extreme cases, to suspend a signatory
from its privileges. 7'
Although Brazil voiced some reservations, the entire
South American block agreed that they would support this
proposal. China was also supportive, as were some Euro-
pean countries, notably the Netherlands. A number of
countries that had rejected the British proposals the day
before, however, were also unwilling to support the
United States plan, viewing it as too extreme.
Because of continued British opposition, Roosevelt
again implored Churchill to relent on the fifth freedom
- Telegram from Winston Churchill to Franklin Roosevelt (Nov. 28, 1944), in
ROOSEVELT & CHURCHILL, supra note 1, doc. 468, at 609.
(19 Id.
70 Id. at 609-10.
7 BERLE &JACOBS, supra note 54, at 507 (diary file Dec. 2, 1944).
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issue. 72 He denied the permanent effects of any American
head start and expressed willingness to make any type of
plane available to the British. 73 Roosevelt then asked
Churchill:
Would you like to see a world in which all ports were
closed to all ships but their own or open to one foreign
ship, perhaps two, if they carried only passengers and
cargo bound all the way from Liverpool to Shanghai?
Where would England be if shipping were subjected to
such limitations? Where will it be if aviation is? I cannot
agree that the answer is to hold everyone back. It must be
rather to go forward together. Given, on both sides, that
spirit of justice and fair play of which you speak, I know
that an agreement can be reached which will be equally
beneficial to both our interests and to the world.74
The plenary session of the conference was engulfed by
new developments on December 1st. The session began
with a speech by New York's Mayor LaGuardia who
pleaded for some kind of general agreement, if not on five
freedoms, then on four, three, or two. Swinton, not want-
ing to appear the eternal wrecker of ideas, thereupon in-
dicated that Great Britain might be willing to consider
agreeing to the the plan for general rights of passage and
technical stops. After this concession there was no going
back without a British loss of face. The French then intro-
duced a proposal that was the literal text of the earlier
United States proposal on all five freedoms, but which
now referred only to the first two freedoms. 75 The confer-
ence decided to incorporate the first two freedoms in a
separate document to be attached to the main convention.
Satisfied to have achieved something tangible at last,
Berle remarked in his notes "the main work of the confer-
72 Telegram from Franklin Roosevelt to Winston Churchill (Nov. 30, 1944), in
ROOSEVELT & CHURCHILL, supra note 1, doc. 470, at 612-13.
73 Id.
74 Telegram from Franklin Roosevelt to Winston Churchill (Nov. 30, 1944), in
ROOSEVELT & CHURCHILL, supra note 1, doc. 470, at 612-13.
75 BERLE &JACOBS, supra note 54, at 508 (diary file Dec. 2, 1944).
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ence is finished."7 6 The Chicago Convention was signed
without the five freedoms of the air on December 7, 1944.
These were only included within the International Air
Services Transit Agreement and the International Air
Transport Agreement, which were signed by those indi-
vidual parties in agreement with the United States
position.
IV. ATLANTIC WATERSHED
Churchill continued to oppose liberalism in the air, and
particularly the United States position on the fifth free-
dom. His views remained those which Great Britain
brought to Chicago. Within one month of the signing of
the new convention, the British Ministry of Civil Aviation
and the British Foreign Office took concerted steps to
reach unofficial agreements with France and other coun-
tries that supported British views at Chicago. The British
hoped that these agreements would present a united front
which would prevent the Americans from obtaining gate-
ways into Europe and the Middle East by way of fifth free-
dom rights.77
On the other side of the Atlantic, the United States con-
tinued to espouse liberalism in international civil aviation.
The United States caused Churchill to fume by discussing
a bilateral air agreement with Ireland without informing
Great Britain.78 In spite of British opposition, a United
76 Id.
77 Letter from Sir George Cribbett, British Deputy Screcretary of the Ministry
of Civil Aviation (MCA) to Foreign Office (Jan. 3, 1945); Remarks by John
Cheetham, First Secretary of the Foreign Office (Jan. 5, 1945) (on file with PRO,
FO F0371, 50,228). The BOAC was not itself displeased with the Chicago Con-
vention. Minutes of Verbal Report by Knollys, BOAC Chairman, to the Board of
the BOAC on the Chicago Convention (Jan. 11, 1945) (available from PRO,
BOAC Papers, AW 1, 4812). While sharing the British reservations on the fifth
freedom, BOAC's chief executive, Knollys, felt that BOAC would be better placed
than the Americans for negotiating fifth freedom rights with countries in Europe
and the Middle East in view of its existing relations. Id.
78 Telegram from Winston Churchill to Franklin Roosevelt (Jan. 27, 1945), in
ROOSEVELT & CHURCHILL, supra note 1, doc. 507, 652-53. At BOAC there was
concern that United States airlines would invade the BOAC's European and Mid-
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States-Irish Agreement was signed on February 3, 1945.79
It granted United States aircraft general operating rights
between the United States, Ireland, and points beyond.80
London viewed this bilateral agreement as a breach of
good faith, particularly because the United States then
commenced negotiations for bilateral civil aviation agree-
ments with Greece, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, and Lebanon. Both
the United States and Great Britain claimed that the other
was improperly pressuring these governments to adhere
to their respective policies. The British suspected Wash-
ington of covertly threatening to withhold economic aid if
United States demands for landing rights were not met.
The United States, on the other hand, accused London of
pressuring Greece, Egypt, Iraq, and Iran to oppose the
United States position which Great Britain portrayed as
the American drive towards world domination in the air.81
Thus, the wartime allies each went their own way.
While the United States continued to seek landing rights
in various countries through Chicago-style liberalism,
Great Britain continued to advocate regulation. An offi-
cial restatement of the British position was formulated as
follows:
In order to avoid uneconomic competition and reduce,
and ultimately eliminate, subsidies, capacity should be set-
tled and varied by agreement, so as to provide a reason-
able equilibrium between the aggregate of services and
the amount of traffic offered on a particular route and that
capacity should be fairly divided between the countries
concerned.8 2
die East markets via the United States-Irish agreement. PRO, BOAC papers, AW
1, 2947.
79 Agreement between the United States of America and Ireland Relating to Air
Transport Services, Feb. 3, 1945, 59 Stat. 1402.
so Id.
"I Telegram from the British Resident Minister in Cairo to the Foreign Office in
London (May 9, 1945) (on file with PRO, FO, 371, 50,246); Memorandum from
U.S. State Department on United Kindgdom International Civil Aviation Policy
(Nov. 21, 1945) (on file with the NA, State Department (STD), Decimal File, Rec-
ord Group 59, 811.79600/22-2145).
112 Note from the British Embassy in Washington, D.C. to the U.S. State Depart-
ment (July 26, 1945) (on file with the PRO, FO, 371, 50,255).
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Great Britain continued to develop its own model for
standard bilateral agreements which defined air transport
along what were essentially political lines, i.e., as end-to-
end traffic. The Ministry of Civil Aviation regarded fifth
freedom rights as an intrusion of uncontrollable commer-
cialism into the predominantly political and strategic busi-
ness of maintaining overseas air connections.8 3 The
British concept contained only third and fourth freedom
rights under which bilateral traffic was divided on a recip-
\rocal 50/50 basis.
BOAC disagreed with this position. In September of
1945, BOAC's advisor on air transport policy, J. Ran-
dolph McCrindle, wrote an influential memorandum to
the Board of BOAC in which he argued that either fifth
freedom provisions must be allowed in the interest of eco-
nomic operation, or, better still, BOAC should be permit-
ted to conduct its own international relations.8 4 BOAC's
opposition, soon to be supported by Swinton, had
profound effects. Great Britain's position was modified to
incorporate two standard forms for bilateral agreement:
one based on end-to-end traffic and another including
limited fifth freedom rights.
The gradual adoption of fifth freedom rights was accel-
erated by a particularly unsettling meeting in Washington
between the British civil air attache Peter Masefield and
American Airlines executives Ralph Damon and Cyrus
Smith. In response to British opposition to fifth freedom
rights, Damon and Smith referred to the fact that both
Ireland and Holland had accepted these rights. They
threatened to bypass Great Britain if the British remained
uncooperative by striking a deal with KLM to organize an
83 Note from Sir George Cribbett, British Deputy Secretary of the Ministry of
Civil Aviation, to the Minister of Civil Aviation (June 15, 1945) (on file with the
PRO, AM, AVIA 2, 2759).
84 Memorandum from J. Randolph McCrindle, BOAC Advisor, to the Board of
BOAC, Control of Capacity in Relation to the Five Freedoms (Sept. 26, 1945) (on file
with the PRO, BOAC Papers, AW 1, 4235).
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Amsterdam-London shuttle service.8 5 Though the For-
eign Office assumed that the Americans were bluffing, the
threat was not wholly unfounded. Eager to recommence
commercial operations, KLM aggressively lobbied the Air
Ministry and Ministry of Civil Aviation (MCA) for months
to have their pre-war rights for an Amsterdam-London
service restored and to be reallocated their old peacetime
facilities at London's Croydon Airport.86 The British felt
that KLM would be eager to cooperate with the
Americans.
Internal opposition to Great Britain's position also con-
tinued. BOAC emphatically pressed for a more liberal
policy. In early October of 1945, Sir William Hildred, Di-
rector-General of Civil Aviation at the MCA, received a
memorandum from BOAC which suggested that the Chi-
cago-regime determination of capacity on the basis of
traffic embarked be replaced by a less stringent system
based on load factors. BOAC argued that a load factor
system was in Great Britain's best interest because
London was not the final destination of a substantial por-
tion of the passengers embarking from the United States
on flights to London. Thus, if capacity were to be divided
on the basis of a traffic-embarked system, an undue ad-
vantage for United States carriers would result. It seemed
more profitable to BOAC to divide capacity on the basis
of load factors. Fifth freedom was thus acceptable in prin-
ciple to BOAC as long as it was granted on a quid pro quo
basis and without any permission for a change of gauge.8
85 Telegram from Peter Masefield, British Civil Air Attach6, to the Foreign Of-
fice (Sept. 12, 1945) (on file with the PRO, FO, 371, 50,258).
86 Note by Sir William Hildred, Director-General of Civil Aviation at the MCA,
commenting on his meeting with Albert Plesman, Managing Director of KLM
(May 5, 1945) (on file with the PRO, MCA, BT217, 64); Letter from H. Spry
Leverton, KLM's London Station Manager, to Sir William Hildred, Director Gen-
eral of Civil Aviation at the MCA, (May 5, 1945) (on file with the PRO, MCA,
BT217, 610).
"7 Letter from Viscount Edward G. Knollys, BOAC Chairman, to Lord Winster,
Minister of Civil Aviation (Oct. 22, 1945) (on file with the PRO, MCA, BT217,
1171). The term "change of gauge" refers to the transfer of passengers from a
large (transatlantic) aircraft to a smaller plane in London for onward destinations
in Europe,
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Adopting a more liberal stand in aviation matters posed
difficult political problems for the recently installed La-
bour Government. A too obvious drift away from estab-
lished British policy on civil aviation was sure to place
Labour in an awkward position because of its established
position as an advocate of public control of the economy
and international cooperation. To allow international civil
aviation to be governed by market forces would make La-
bour appear to support principles that even the previous
Conservative Government had rejected.
Internal politics, albeit important to the Labour Gov-
ernment, caused only a small ripple in the pool of Anglo-
American civil aviation relations compared to general fi-
nancial and economic issues. At the end of wartime hos-
tilities in August 1945, President Truman terminated the
Lend-Lease Agreement of 1941,88 under which the United
States had supplied Britain with food and weapons on
credit during the war. This decision, for which the British
were completely unprepared, had a dramatic impact in
London. It threatened to wreck Great Britain's economy
at a point in time when most of the country's financial
reserves were depleted because of the war. Enormous
sums of money were needed for reconstruction and post-
war imports that would have to be purchased primarily
from the United States. Great Britain then initiated bilat-
eral talks regarding the conditions upon which the United
States would supply vital post-war aid. The United States
made it clear from the outset that this assistance would
come at a price: post-war aid to Great Britain was to be in
the form of a loan and linked to a general revision of fi-
nancial and trading relations between the two countries.
These revisions were to promote the twin interests of the
United States: the liberalization of world trade and
maintainence of Great Britain as a major trading partner.
M Preliminary Agreement Between the United States of America and the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Respecting the Principles
Applying to Mutual Aid in the Prosecution of the War Against Aggression, Feb.
23, 1942, 56 Stat. 1433.
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On September 11, 1945, discussions in Washington be-
gan on a variety of issues related to transportation and
trade, among them shipping. Great Britain took a liberal
position on this issue because of its large merchant navy.
Great Britain's attempt to assert liberalism in this area of
transportation, however, was hard to reconcile with its re-
strictionism regarding aviation. Great Britain thereby en-
dangered its negotiating position in both areas. The head
of the British delegation, John Maynard Keynes, urged
the Ministry of Civil Aviation to sacrifice restrictions on
aviation for the more economically important liberaliza-
tion of shipping.8 9 London instead tried to keep shipping
and aviation separate as to both time and space.90 This
tactic was unsuccessful. As talks on the Loan Agreement
progressed, London began to fear that the United States
would condition shepherding the loan through Congress
upon British acceptance of American style liberalism in
the air, since the United States also used this loan as a
lever to push Britain into formal ratification of the Bret-
ton Woods Agreements of July 19449' regarding the
shape of the post-war world economy and the establish-
ment of the International Monetary Fund. This pressure
resulted in a reluctant shift of British policy away from
protectionism.
Meanwhile, in the United States, the desirability of
complete freedom in the air was being debated. The
President asked Congress to ratify the Chicago Conven-
tion forthwith in order to spur the process of ratification
by other nations.92 Ideas of free competition had led to
the abandonment of the chosen instrument principle for
89 Memorandum from Sir William Hildred, Director-General of Civil Aviation
of the MCA, to Lord Winster, Minister of Civil Aviation (Oct. 6, 1945)(on file with
the PRO, MCA, BT217, 1171).
90 Note from Cheetham, Foreign Office, to Arthur Bevin, Foreign Secretary
(Oct. 25, 1945) (on file with the PRO, FO, F0371, 50,264) (on the basis of a letter
from Winster).
!" Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment, Dec. 27, 1945, T.I.A.S. 1502.
12 Hearings on the Chicago Convention were held on February 20 and 23, and
March 6, 9, 10, 23 and 26, 1945. CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION:
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overseas operations. This principle was replaced by a sys-
tem of regulated competition. 3 On June 1, 1945, the
CAB decided the North Atlantic Route Case,94 which institu-
tionalized admission to the potential boom market of
post-war transatlantic air services. As a result, Pan Am
gained two competitors: American Export Airlines
(renamed American Overseas Airlines (AOA) on Novem-
ber 10, 1945, after its merger with American Airlines) and
Trans World Airlines (TWA).95 The Route Case decision
limited Pan Am to its pre-war routes by allowing it to op-
erate only to fixed points in Britain, France, Ireland and
Portugal.9 6  Trippe felt that this limitation unduly ham-
pered Pan Am's freedom to develop its overseas network
as it saw fit. Because permits granted to TWA and AOA
did not contain any explicit restriction of routes and land-
ing points, 7 Pan Am claimed unfair treatment and mobil-
ized its supporters in Congress to attempt to block the
CAB decision.
The case reached Truman's desk. Pan Am argued that
it was being treated unfairly as it was not given the right
to operate services to any point in France other than Mar-
seille, while TWA was permitted to serve Paris and any
other point in France excepting Marseille. Further, Pan
Am was restricted to the isolated airport of Foynes on the
Western coast of Ireland while TWA could serve Dublin
and thus gain a larger share of Irish traffic. Pan Am would
face competition from AOA in London and was not per-
mitted to serve other points in Britain. In Portugal Pan
Am would be limited to Lisbon. TWA had received rights
to fly to Italy and a few points in the Middle East. Addi-
tionally, Northern Europe and the Soviet Union, except
HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 79th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1945).
93 U.S. SENATE COMMITrEE ON COMMERCE REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL AIR POL-
ICY, (July 27, 1945) (on file with NA, SEN 79a-F6, 106).
4 6 C.A.B. 319 (1945).
, Id. at 325, 342, 350-52.
Id. at 351.
117 Id. at 350-51.
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for southern Germany, would fall largely under the mo-
nopoly of AOA.98 Pan Am therefore believed that it had
been dealt less than its fair share of the market. Although
Pan Am did not demand the complete exclusion of AOA
and TWA from the Atlantic routes Pan Am did seek full
freedom of competitive action. 99 Pan Am's complaints
were brushed aside as contrary to the aviation policy of
the CAB. 00
The United States now had several airlines operating
over the North Atlantic. Having established international
air transportation on a competitive footing, the CAB ad-
dressed the important issue of fifth freedom rights. CAB
Chairman L. Welch Pogue expressed disappointment at
British opposition to the International Air Transport
Agreement concluded at Chicago in a letter to the Secre-
tary of State. The CAB Chairman argued it was of the
utmost importance that the British grant fifth freedom
rights as soon as possible and cease its obstruction of ap-
proaches by the United States to third countries for bilat-
eral agreements on fifth freedom rights.
The United States expected that access to the American
air traffic market in exchange for liberal bilateral agree-
ments would present an attractive deal to any nation.
Pogue ascribed the failure of this strategy to British influ-
ence behind the scenes. His suspicions were not unjusti-
fied. The British goal was to stall the United States,
particularly in Europe, until Great Britain's airlines were
in a stronger, more competitive position.' 0' In response,
98 Id. at 351.
- Petition of Pan Am for Reargument, Rehearing and Reconsideration at 31,
North Atlantic Route Case, argued before the CAB, in Harry S. Truman Presiden-
tial Library, Independence, MI, [hereinafter HST-LIB] (undated, July/Aug.
1945), file 3i: North Atlantic Route Case.
,-o Order Denying Petitions for Rehearing, Reargument and Reconsideration,
North Atlantic Route Case, argued before the CAB, in HST-LIB (Nov. 1945), file
3i: North Atlantic Route Case.
1o, Memorandum from Sir George Cribbett, British Deputy Secretary of the
Ministry of Civil Aviation, to Sir William Hildred, Director-General of Civil Avia-
tion at the MCA (June 25, 1945) (on file with the PRO, MCA, BT217, 126). Hil-
dred fully agreed.
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Pogue asked that economic pressure be placed on Great
Britain and her supporters:
In like manner, we suggest if Great Britain should con-
tinue over our protest to assert her influence to block our
attempts to conclude bilateral agreements, the Depart-
ment could, to equal advantage, make the satisfaction of
certain British needs conditional upon her agreement to
cease interfering with our attempts to secure these
agreements. ' 0 2
He added that he was not suggesting that direct relief
funds and supplies be denied but only that some of the
less critical extras be used as leverage. 0 3 Pogue urged
the Department of State to adopt this view in order to se-
cure United States superiority in international civil avia-
tion. 0 4  According to Pogue, this new approach could
first be used to pressure the French into accepting a bilat-
eral agreement on American terms in exchange for the
delivery of badly needed C-54 aircraft to Air France.10 5
Pogue also suggested that, if necessary, the same tactics
could secure United States interests in Holland, Portugal,
Belgium, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, and Turkey.' 6 The State
Department disagreed at first and argued that if the
United States embarked on such a policy aviation policy
would become too closely connected with general eco-
nomic issues. 0 7 In Great Britain's case, however, a reluc-
tant State Department was persuaded that the United
States should compromise only as a last resort and that
therefore the United States should utilize its bargaining
position to the fullest extent possible.'08 As a result, avia-
102 Letter from L. Welch Pogue, CAB Chairman, to the Secretary of State, Uuly





107 Letter from Joseph P. Grew, Acting Secretary of State, to L. Welch Pogue,
CAB Chairman (July 31, 1945) (on file with the HST-LIB, CAB, General, C7(BOX
10)).
10, Memorandum of meeting by William Clayton, Assistant U.S. Secretary of
State (Sept. 7, 1945) (on file with the HST-LIB, Clayton Papers, BOX 1, Aviation).
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tion experts were attached to the delegation sent to finan-
cial and trade discussions with Great Britain.
As the British had feared, efforts now increased to pres-
sure Great Britain to agree to the United States position
on aviation. These met with stiff resistance because of the
British strategy of separating aviation concerns from
other economic issues in Anglo-American relations. On
September 10, 1945, Morgan questioned Masefield about
the reasons for Great Britain's opposition. Masefield re-
plied that London did not consider the matter to be very
urgent; surely civil aviation could be addressed separately
without inserting it into the context of general economic
matters between the two countries. Morgan informed
him that this was not the view of the United States and
that the State Department considered aviation as a prime
subject in discussions of general economic relations be-
tween the two countries. 09
By November, an interim agreement which provided
for a system of double approval of rates and regulation of
capacity was under discussion. This approval system was
included at the insistence of Great Britain, which was pri-
marily concerned with the reduction of unfair subsidies.
Trippe, however, vigorously opposed any solution along
these lines preferring control of frequencies to govern-
mental interference in rate-making. A system of con-
trolled frequencies, but free rates would make it easier for
Pan Am to force its new competitors, AOA and TWA,
from desirable routes by undercutting their fares. Trippe
announced Pan Am's intention to drastically reduce its
transatlantic fare from $375 to $275 in late October." 0
The result was confusion and British fury. Pan Am's
move confirmed British fears of cut-throat competition
I- Memorandum from Stokely Morgan to the Secretary of State (Sept. 10,
1945) (on file with the NA, StD, 711.4127/9-1045).
H0 Even that was not Pan Am's greatest reduction. Earlier that year, PanAm
had supplied the Dutch KLM with confidential information regarding its intended
fare structure after the war. Fares were envisaged to go down to $186.30 for the
New York-London route. Board Meeting Minutes (Mar. 24, 1945) (on file with
the KLM Royal Dutch Airlines archive (Amstelveen, Netherlands)).
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unless a fare regulatory agreement could be reached with
the United States. Even at its pre-reduction rate of $375
Pan Am was charging nearly $200 less for a transatlantic
return ticket than its competitors BOAC and AGA."t On
November 24, 1945, Hildred threatened to reduce Pan
Am's five weekly flights to the two flights a week it was
actually entitled to under its 1937 permit, while maintain-
ing the provisional capacity of 500 seats a week for both
United States and British operators across the Atlantic.
Pan Am faced the risk of being pushed back in favor of its
competitor AOA." 2 Other United States airlines were
warned that if they matched Pan Am's new fare their pro-
visional permits would be withdrawn. ' 3 In a letter to the
State Department that same day, Masefield added that
although Great Britain realized that the CAB did not have
the power to fix rates, some action by the United States
government would be necessary to control Pan Am. '
4
Great Britain stated that PanAm must maintain a $375
rate in order to be permitted to operate more than two
weekly flights.
These were harsh measures between friends and allies,
but Pan Am's rate-cutting put the British in a difficult po-
sition. The day after Masefield's letter, Morgan told
Trippe and Smith of AOA that the United States govern-
ment recognized that airlines could operate into Britain
only under the conditions prescribed by the British gov-
ernment. Although the United States disagreed with the
control of frequencies, the fixing of rates, and the severe
limitations on fifth freedom rights that the British pro-
posed, the State Department felt that it had no option but
111 John C. Cooper, Pan Am International Vice-President, Pan Am Press State-
ment (Dec. 3, 1945) (on file with McGill University, Montreal, John C. Cooper
Papers 543).
112 Letter from L. Welch Pogue, CAB Chairman, to John T. Trippe, PanAm
Chief Executive Officer (Nov. 29, 1945) (on file with McGill University, Montreal,
John C. Cooper Papers 542).
,,1 Telegram from the U.S. Embassy in London to the U.S. Department of State
(Nov. 24, 1945) (on file with the NA, Std, 711.4127/11-2445).
,,4 Letter from Peter Masefield, British Civil Air Attach, to Stokely Morgan
(Nov. 24, 1945) (on file with NA, StD, 811.79641/11-2445).
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to accept Britain's conditions pending the conclusion of a
formal bilateral agreement." ' Compliance would offer
more long-term benefits to United States airlines than any
short-term gains that would result from the imposition of
United States dominance. Smith was prepared to accept
this. Trippe, however, was determined to find an alterna-
tive." 6 In a conversation the next day with Morgan,
Trippe remarked that the present policy was actually a
tacit consent for United States carriers to enter into rate
fixing and other restrictive arrangements with the British.
In his opinion, the United States should suspend opera-
tions on British-approved rates and fly only the two serv-
ices permitted by the 1937 agreement, i.e., let only Pan
Am fly. Morgan was opposed to this because it would
mean that the United States had actively helped to restrict
aviation and thereby decreased aviation service to the
public. Adoption of the State Department plan would
mean that Great Britain, not the United States, would be
responsible for restricting aviation. Morgan was also
fairly certain that Great Britain would relent on the fre-
quency issue if services were operated only at agreed
upon rates. Trippe disagreed and stressed the impor-
tance of avoiding a position in which the United States
would be permanently tied to governmental rate fixing." 7
Because the loan issue was pending in Congress, the
controversy over the Pan Am rate question occured at a
critical time. Due to the extensive financial and material
wartime aid to Great Britain, there was a strong feeling in
the United States that Great Britain should now stand on
its own two feet. Matters threatened to become stormy.
W. Lee O'Daniel, Senator for Texas, in his capacity as
member of the Senate Committee on Commerce, sug-
gested that the United States should condition the loan to
I15 Id.
116 Memorandum from Stokely Morgan to Secretary of State (Nov. 25, 1945)
(on filed with NA, StD, 811.79641/11-2545).
"17 Memorandum from Stokely Morgan to the Secretary of State (Nov. 26,
1945) (on file with the NA, StD, 811.79641/11-2645).
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Great Britain on the conclusion of a satisfactory civil air
agreement." 8 His was not the only voice heard in this re-
spect. The State Department's final decision was to stick
to its earlier position: discussions of the loan and aviation
issues would remain separate after all, although the Brit-
ish would not be informed of this decision. On the con-
trary, Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson used the
loan issue on several occasions to pressure Britain to
enter into bilateral talks on aviation.
Masefield did not succeed in monitoring these develop-
ments closely enough to become aware of the United
States decision to separate loan and aviation issues.
London therefore had little real knowledge of events in
the American camp and relied instead upon what the
Americans said, which was misleading. Indeed, on No-
vember 15, 1945, SecretaryJames Byrnes, while talking to
Clement Attlee during the latter's first visit to Washington
in his capacity as Prime Minister, stressed the need for a
productive conference on civil aviation in the near future
because of the unsettled state of bilateral civil aviation.
Secretary Byrnes noted Trippe's efforts to produce a Sen-
ate rejection of the loan agreement with Britain. Byrnes
suggested that a conference be held in either Washington
or Bermuda immediately after the ongoing telecommuni-
cations conference. 119
Troubled, the British backed down somewhat on fares.
To soften public opinion in the United States, Great Brit-
ain was eager to make a gesture regarding the rate issue
and indicated that it might be prepared to allow Pan Am
to introduce its rate of $275 (as compared to $375 by
BOAC) until the conclusion of a bilateral conference on
aviation. Trippe, however, was resolved to show that Pan
Am had been forced to maintain high fares by the British
'I' Letter from Senator W. Lee O'Daniel, Member of Senate Committee on
Commerce, to the Secretary of State (Dec. 19, 1945) (on file with the NA, StD,
811.79641/12-1945).
119 Telegram from the British Embassy in Washington, D.C. to the Foreign Of-
fice in London (Nov. 17, 1945) (on file with PRO, FO, 371, 50,267).
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and sought public outcry condemning British actions. In
general, Trippe preferred frequency control to rate con-
trol and had by this time reached an informal agreement
including only frequency controls with BOAC.12 0  He
challenged Great Britain by repeating Pan Am's intention
to reduce transatlantic fares to $275,12' and stepped up
Pan Am's advertising campaign explaining why air fares
could not be lowered.
In response, the Foreign Office issued a formal memo-
randum in which Great Britain stated that, as of Decem-
ber 10, 1945, Pan Am and American Overseas Airlines
would be allowed to operate up to fourteen services per
week to Britain (six additional weekly flights) at a fixed
rate of $375. Rates were to remain at this price until
IATA recommended another rate. The permit was tem-
porary and would remain in force only until a permanent
Anglo-American bilateral agreement was concluded. It
allowed for third and fourth freedom traffic only. The
British message was clear: carriers who dodged the $375
fare would have their permits withdrawn. 22 Pan Am was
effectively forced to conform to the British rate.123
Continued pressure from Acheson now paid off. On
January 3, 1946, Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador to
Washington, told Acheson that London had agreed to
convene a conference on the aviation issue in Bermuda on
short notice.' 24 That same day, Livingston Satterhwaite,
the United States civil air attache in London, had a con-
versation with Hildred. British anxiety about the loan,
shortly to be debated in Congress, was revealed by Hil-
1o Telegram from the U.S. Embassy in London to the U.S. Department of State
(Dec. 1, 1945) (on file with the NA, StD, 711.4127/12-145).
12, Telegram from U.S. Embassy in London to U.S. Department of State (Dec.
3, 1945) (on file with the NA, StD, 811.79641/12-345).
122 Memorandum Peter Masefield, British Civil Air Attache, to the U.S. Depart-
ment of State (Dec. 10, 1945) (on file with the NA, StD, 811.79641/12-1045).
123 Telegram from U.S. Embassy in London to U.S. Department of State (Dec.
7, 1945) (on file with NA, StD, 711.4127/12-745).
124 Memorandum by Dean Acheson, Acting U.S. Secretary of State, of conversa-




dred's indication that Great Britain would no longer press
for frequency control: "[t]he key note to the British con-
ception of order in the air is not frequencies escalation...
but uniform fares based on the costs of the most effective
operator."'' 25 Fifth freedom remained an issue to be re-
solved, although Hildred suggested that Great Britain was
willing to make some allowance for such traffic in the in-
terest of the travelling public. On the question of rates,
the British now began to interpret IATA's role as a true
supra-national organization. This change in position was
revealed by Hildred's insistence that Pan Am attend and
conform to rates set at an IATA conference to convene in
Montreal on January 8, 1946.
Preparations for a conference finally began. The
United States ambassador in London, John Winant, wrote
in the months prior to the conference that there had been
an increasing willingness in British government circles to
agree to the United States position of liberalism in the air,
especially since the United States had been successful in
concluding a number of liberally inspired bilateral agree-
ments in 1945 that provided generous fifth freedom
rights.126 The fares crisis had had a profound negative ef-
fect by hardening the positions of those in Great Britain
who supported restrictions. Pan Am's actions had seemed
to indicate that freedom of rates would push BOAC, and
possibly AOA and TWA, from transatlantic routes by al-
lowing the undercutting of prices. Predatory tactics such
as rate-cutting formed the basis of British fears. 12 7
Although differences still existed, the gap between the
British and American positions was narrowing. The CAB
did not raise objections to the participation of United
States airlines in the IATA conference on rates until very
late in the day. The CAB also deferred consideration of
125 Telegram from U.S. Embassy in London to U.S. Department of State (Dec.
3, 1945) (on file with NA, StD, 711.4127/12-345).
126 Telegram from John Winant, U.S. Ambassador to London, to U.S. Depart-
ment of State (Jan. 11, 1946) (on file with the NA, 711.4127/12-345).
127 Id.
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IATA rate control until further notice. The CAB reversed
its decision, however, at the very last minute, after the
United States delegates had already arrived in Montreal.
The CAB indicated at this point that it preferred to com-
plete a bilateral agreement with Britain at Bermuda prior
to a general international approach through IATA.
V. BERMUDA ANTICLIMAX
If the British were in the dark about what was going on
inside the American camp, the United States, for its part,
did not fully appreciate the importance which the loan is-
sue had assumed for the British. On January 3, 1946, Sir
Henry Self, the British representative to the Wartime
Combined Production and Resources Board in Washing-
ton and one of the senior negotiators of the Loan Agree-
ment, was appointed to lead the British delegation at
Bermuda. The link between the loan and Bermuda was
also stressed in Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin's telegram
of appointment to Self. Nevertheless, Great Britain in-
tended to go no further than the exploration of a possible
basis for a bilateral agreement which was then to be nego-
tiated on the ministerial plane, especially since Britain's
bargaining position in the upcoming talks was not a
strong one. Hildred summed up the main topics likely to
be discussed as follows: 1) control of frequencies and the
question of possible escalation; 2) rate-control; and 3)
fifth freedom. As a fall-back position on frequency con-
trol, Great Britain was willing to accept an escalator clause
which would allow more flights to efficient operators that
could show through traffic statistics and load factors that
they were generating extra traffic. IATA was to play a cru-
cial role in setting recommendations for transatlantic
fares. The British found fifth freedom acceptable in prin-
ciple provided that it be on a reduced frequency basis, i.e.,
less flights/seats for destinations beyond the initial disem-
barkation point. Primary frequencies, in this case United
States-United Kingdom traffic, must not be allowed to in-
crease as a result of fifth freedom. The overriding impor-
[57
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tance of securing the United States loan made itself felt
even at this point: the British delegation was instructed to
ultimately agree if the United States insisted on untram-
melled fifth freedom rights. The only condition that the
British would insist on would be a price difference for fifth
freedom tickets from London, which would make United
States flights more expensive than British flights to Eu-
rope. As long as the United States agreed to a fare con-
trol, the British would agree to almost anything. Hildred
wrote: "Our discussions will take place under the implied
threat that unless the United States secure what they want,
there will be no approval for the loan. "128
This was the situation when the two delegations first
met in Bermuda on January 16, 1946. In light of British
anxiety over the loan, it was hardly surprising that the
British adopted a low profile in the discussions and left it
to the United States to come forward with initiatives. Af-
ter all the previous maneuvering, a somewhat strange sit-
uation now developed. Having decided to keep civil
aviation apart from the general scope of Anglo-American
economic relations, thus willingly forsaking direct use of
the loan as a bargaining chip, the United States showed
themselves to be in a very benign mood. They had little
idea how powerful their position was, even without actual
resort to putting the loan in the balance. 129 Their aim was
to quickly reach an agreement conceding freedom of fre-
quencies and some provision for fifth freedom traffic. Be-
cause the British had decided beforehand to agree to
almost anything the United States might propose once the
matter of fares was resolved satisfactorily, the resulting
negotiations were lukewarm.
Three days into the conference, George Baker, Director
of the Office of Transport and Communications Policy at
128 Letter from Sir William Hildred, Director-General of Civil Aviation at the
MCA, to Sir Alan Barlow, Treasury (Jan. 9, 1946) (on file with the PRO, FO, 371,
54,495).
29 Interview by the author with L. Welch Pogue, CAB Chairman (Feb. 10,
1989).
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the State Department and the United States chief dele-
gate, telegraphed William Clayton, Assistant Secretary of
State for Economic Affairs, that the talks were progressing
according to expectations. The British appeared willing
to surrender frequencies control on third and fourth free-
dom traffic in order to extract an agreement on rate con-
trol. The fifth freedom issue could probably also be
settled satisfactorily along the lines of the recent United
States-French draft bilateral agreement. The remaining
issues were how far the CAB would be willing to go on
rate control and whether the CAB would accept IATA as a
fare-setting body. 130 In private conversations with British
delegates, Baker expressed his willingness to subscribe to
the doctrine that the ideal traffic division among con-
tracting parties would be to strike an equilibrium between
traffic offering and traffic capacity. Baker also agreed that
long-haul services (third and fourth freedom ultimate des-
tination traffic) should be designated a primary objective
of the agreement. Capacity should then be divided on a
50/50 basis between the parties to the agreement.' 3'
At the Ministry of Civil Aviation in London, Deputy
Secretary Sir George Cribbett advised that now was the
time to introduce the principle of escalation in order to
permit North Atlantic traffic to find its own level through
future development. 32 Determination of capacity could
thus be arrived at on a trial and error basis.' 33
On January 23rd, after a week of delicately probing the
1-0 Telegram from George Baker, Director of the Office of Transport and Com-
munication Policy, U.S. Department of State, to William Clayton, Assistant U.S.
Secretary of State (Jan. 19, 1946) (on file with the NA, StD, 841.796/1-1946).
13, Secret Telegram from Henry Self, British Representative to the Wartime
Combined Production and Resources Board, to Foreign Office (Jan. 20, 1946) (on
file with the PRO, FO, 371, 55,496).
312 Top Secret Telegram from Sir George Cribbett, Deputy Secretary of the
Ministry of Civil Aviation, London, to the U.K. Delegation, Bermuda (Jan. 22,
1956) (on file with the PRO, FO, 371, 54496).
I" Id. This directly led to the ex-post facto review of capacity. The point is not
without importance, as it has been supposed that the ex-post facto division of
capacity represented the liberal spirit of Bermuda. However, from Cribbett's tele-
gram, it becomes clear the reason for ex-post facto was not liberalism, but the
down-to-earth desire for an orderly development of civil aviation. Hence, it was
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British position, the United States suggested that they
would be willing to exchange rate control for the aban-
donment of control on third and fourth freedom frequen-
cies. The possibility of lifting restrictions on fifth freedom
was also raised. These proposals were welcomed by the
British delegates, most strongly by Henry Self. The
United States proposals were well within the limits im-
posed by London prior to the conference and the loan is-
sue had never even been introduced. A year later Baker
remembered:
As one of the delegates to Bermuda, I know the question
of the loan was constantly in our minds, not as a tool
which we could or would use in bargaining, but as a tre-
mendous incentive toward the completion of some ade-
quate agreement since we all knew that failure to get an
agreement might jeopardize the accomplishment of the
loan which the administration which we represented so
earnestly desired to put through. 3 4
Discussion then centered on fifth freedom rights. The fi-
nal agreement granted fifth freedom rights to the United
States on all routes to points beyond Britain which were
presently desired or in operation. 35
The issue of change of gauge remained to be settled.
Change of gauge referred to the right to transfer passen-
gers with a final destination beyond Britain to a smaller
aircraft in London. This was of considerable interest to
the United States because the use of smaller planes after
the majority of passengers were unloaded in the British
capital would greatly benefit the economic efficiency of
United States carriers flying to Europe and the Middle
East. Here, Great Britain again showed its willingness to
thought most practical to allow the traffic to find its own equilibrium first before
pressing for curtailment of frequencies and capacity.
'- G.P. Baker, The Bermuda Plan as the Basis for A Multilateral Agreement,
Lecture Delivered at McGill University, Montreal, Canada (Apr. 18, 1947).
1-1 The question of rate-control was settled in Annex II of the Bermuda Agree-
ment of February 11, 1946. The issue of fifth freedom was dealt with in clauses 5
and 6 of the Final Act of the Civil Aviation Conference held at Bermuda, and
Annex III(b) of the Bermuda Agreement.
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accommodate the United States agenda. The two delega-
tions reached agreement in principle on changes of air-
craft. Britain stipulated, however, that prior permission
for change of guage must be obtained but assured the
United States that permission would not be unreasonably
withheld. The right to a change of gauge would also be
limited to the necessities of airline economy. In addition,
the agreement specifically provided that fifth freedom op-
erations could only take place as a continuation of trunk
services and that no separate schedules for onward flights
would be permitted. The smaller aircraft would have to
wait for the trunk service to come in.'3 6 Although the
United States delegation was not happy with restrictions
on change of gauge because it imposed foreign control on
United States commercial airline operations, the agree-
ment which had been reached was left standing. At the
explicit request of the United States delegation, the prin-
ciples agreed upon were memorialized in a formal agree-
ment between the two countires.13 7
Despite the fact that it provided Great Britain with sub-
stantial safeguards against overpowering United States
competition, the Bermuda Agreement was not welcomed
in London. The British Cabinet was unanimous in its dis-
like of the Bermuda terms. The main stumbling block was
the United States' insistence that fifth freedom rights
must be combined with the right to change of gauge.
Nevertheless, the British Cabinet's strong feeling that the
United States must be obliged in order to get the loan
they sought weighed heavily on the question of whether
to sign the agreement.3 M The sorry state of Great Brit-
ain's economy proved decisive. After a few days of delib-
erations, the Cabinet decided to shelve its reservations in
order to secure the loan and gave Henry Self official ap-
136 Annex to the Bermuda Agreement, art. 5.
137 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the United Kingdom Relating to Air Services Between Their
Respective Territories, February 11, 1946, 60 Stat. 1499, T.I.A.S. 1507.
.8 Summary of Cabinet Discussions on the Draft of the Bermuda Agreement
(Feb. 4, 1946) (on file with the PRO, FO, 371, 54,503).
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proval to proceed.13 9
In contrast to the British reaction, the United States
delegates returned from Bermuda feeling satisfied. Pogue
spoke of the agreement before the Senate Committee on
Commerce as:
bridging the gap between the old pre-war restrictionist at-
titude toward the development of international air trans-
portation and the new concept of international air
transportation as being an instrument of transportation
designed to promote trade and travel on a wide basis and
to permit international air carriers, including our own, to
have a fair opportunity of developing the great potential
business which we believe to be available.' 4
Neither party was prepared for the bombshell that fol-
lowed. While the two delegations were engaged in discus-
sions, Pan Am had been preparing a last-ditch battle to
prevent its fall from grace. With the "Senator from Pan
Am," Owen Brewster, leading the attack, the Committee
on Commerce rejected the Chicago Convention, the In-
ternational Air Transport Agreement, and the Bermuda
Agreement on constitutional and legal grounds.' 4' The
resolution adopted by the Committee stated:
1. That no agreements of this character should be made
except in the form of treaties to be considered by the Sen-
ate; that any Executive agreement which purports to grant
to any foreign country the right to have an airline or air-
lines nominated by it to operate to or from United States
territory without public hearing in advance and the deter-
mination of the public interest by the Civil Aeronautics
Board called for under section 402 of the Civil Aeronau-
tics Act, is inconsistent not only with the Constitution but
'39 Extract from Cabinet Conclusions on the Bermuda Agreement (Feb. 7,
1946) (on file with PRO, FO, 371, 54,503).
140 Civil Aviation Agreements, 1946: Hearings on S. 1814 Before the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1946) (statement of L. Welch Pogue, Chairman
of the CAB). Baker was also quite pleased with the results, though neither he nor
Pogue expected Bermuda to form a lasting agreement. Videotape of George
Baker's lecture at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass.
(Sept. 20, 1979); Interview by the author with L. Welch Pogue (Feb. 10, 1989).
141 S. Res. 173, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946).
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with the letter and spirit of said act, and therefore illegal
and void; and that any and all proceedings thereunder
should be forthwith terminated by appropriate notice to
the Governments concerned.
2. That, notwithstanding the International Air Transport
Agreement and the bilateral agreements above men-
tioned, this Government is not bound by such agreements
so long as the same have not been ratified as treaties, but
the Civil Aeronautics Board and the President continue to
have the duty and the obligation of passing, without pre-
judgment, upon the question whether any proposed oper-
ation by a foreign-flag air line is in the public interest as
defined in the Civil Aeronautics Act. 14 2
A time-bomb thus lay under both the Chicago Conven-
tion and the Bermuda Agreement. The Committee's re-
jection created a grave situation and caused much
concern. At the White House, the President's Secretary,
Matthew J. Connelly, discovered "that the resolution was
drafted by representatives of the Pan American Airways,
with a view to further clouding the issues relative to Brit-
ish-American agreements, relating to civil aviation.' 43
The adoption of the resolution by the full Senate had to
be prevented because it would not only be a blow to the
Truman Administration, but would also seriously jeop-
ardize United States international civil aviation policy.
The United States would be forced to withdraw from both
the Chicago Convention and the Bermuda Agreement,
causing a major setback to international civil aviation.
Consequently, pressure was applied to prevent the Senate
adoption of the resolution. In a special message to the
Senate, Truman urged adoption of the Chicago Conven-
tion. The President stated that a number of countries
were withholding ratification of the Convention because
the United States ratification had been pending in Con-
gress since March 12, 1945, when Roosevelt had asked for
142 Id.
'4- Memorandum from Matthew J. Connelly, Presidential Secretary, to Harry
Truman (Apr. 22, 1946) (on file with the HST-LIB, OF 249, Off. agrt. folder).
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immediate consideration and ratification. 44
Brewster's clout in Congress, however, was not easily
overcome. Brewster attacked the very legality of execu-
tive agreements by questioning the President's constitu-
tional powers to sign such agreements without consulting
Congress. He also claimed that international civil aviation
policy was not receiving proper attention at the State De-
partment and pointed to the recent resignations of impor-
tant figures in United States aviation diplomacy like
Stokely Morgan and George Baker, which he interpreted
as clear signs of dissatisfaction with present policy. 45 The
State Department issued a press statement in response to
these criticisms on the morning ofJuly 25, 1946 which im-
plied that the United States would withdraw from the In-
ternational Air Transport Agreement. Convening in
executive session that same afternoon, the Senate
adopted the Chicago Convention. 46 Senate approval of
Chicago also had the effect of lending legality to the Ber-
muda Agreement.
Bermuda did not, however, stamp out the basic differ-
ences in United States and British policy on international
civil aviation. Acheson suggested that the United States
and Britain should have further discussions in order to ar-
rive at a general implementation of Bermuda which would
then serve as a blueprint for other bilateral agreements.147
A United States delegation was sent to London to discuss
the Bermuda principles and a joint protocol was arrived at
on September 14th which stated that Bermuda was to
form the basis for all future agreements on bilateral civil
aviation issues.
144 Report of the hearing for the President (June 14, 1946) (on file with the
HST-LIB, OF 249, Off. Agrt. folder).
145 Id.
146 92 CONG. REC. 8, 9945-72 (1946).
147 Letter from Dean Acheson, Acting Secretary of State, to Lord Inverchapel
(Aug. 12, 1946) (on file with the HST-LIB, OF 249, Off. Agrt. folder).
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VI. CONCLUSION
This article discusses the effects which differing British
and United States approaches to international civil avia-
tion had upon the final form of the Chicago Convention
and the Bermuda-I Agreement, and thus on the shape of
international civil air transport since World War II. At
Chicago, a collision of British and United States interests
produced a convention which addressed basic legal and
technical issues, but avoided the key issue of contempo-
rary international civil air transport: the primacy of poli-
tics as opposed to commercialism. The United States
interest in open skies and free trade clashed with British
ideas on the regulation of air transport and British inter-
ests in curbing airline losses.
By leaving these basic issues unsettled, Chicago neces-
sitated major compromise. Because United States carriers
were ready to commence transatlantic services, the United
States had a strong incentive to hammer out an agree-
ment with Great Britain. Additionally, Great Britain's po-
sition as the United States ally most likely to offer the
largest market for transatlantic air travel would enable
United States carriers to cash in on the headstart they en-
joyed at the time. Great Britain, on the other hand, after
seeing its proposal for fare regulation turned down by the
United States at Chicago, embarked upon a policy aimed
at curbing United States intrusion into European and
Middle Eastern air travel markets in order to protect its
own national carrier BOAC. For a time, the United States
tried to overcome this resistance by tying aviation to the
larger context of Anglo-American economic relations; in
particular, the loan to Great Britain then under discus-
sion. This policy was more successful than Washington
realized. It severely limited Great Britain's ability to deny
the United States the position in international air trans-
port that they claimed and actually forced London to re-
consider the British position altogether. Unknown to
Great Britain, the link-up between the loan and interna-
tional civil aviation issues was secretly abandoned by the
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State Department in light of PanAm's high-handed atti-
tude towards the question of fares. Unrestricted prices
were seen to run counter to the Administration's inten-
tion that several United States airlines operate over the
Atlantic. The fare crisis revealed that unregulated compe-
tition might carry disadvantages for United States carriers
as well as the British carrier.
In the context of Great Britain's anxiety over the United
States loan, London's acceptance of liberal third and
fourth freedom rights at the subsequent Bermuda Confer-
ence was not surprising. Because of the difficulties of its
overextended economy, Great Britain had always been
primarily concerned with control of foreign airline subsi-
dies and the reduction of losses that would be suffered by
BOAC. British policy therefore focused on fares. If fares
could be controlled, the British reasoned, BOAC would
be able to compete with the United States carriers even if
it operated less efficiently. If freedom of fares was ac-
cepted, even under a system of frequency control, BOAC,
with its ramshackle fleet of converted bombers and exotic
flying boats, could not be competitive and would there-
fore continue to suffer heavy losses. These losses would
only be made worse by the need to match fares offered by
the American carriers.
The Pan Am fare crisis thus worked to Britain's advan-
tage. It offered an additional justification to the position
that rate control should be traded for liberalization of
third and fourth freedom frequencies. Great Britain's po-
sition that fifth freedom traffic must be limited in order to
protect BOAC against possible cut-throat competition
from PanAm on routes between London, Europe, and the
United States was also bolstered by the fare crisis.
Bermuda thus presented something of a victory for the
British, who managed to curtail United States competition
with BOAC across the Atlantic and in Europe. Great Brit-
ain's economic plight was so severe, however, that had the
United States presented a clearer set of objectives at Ber-
muda and used the loan issue as leverage, Great Britain
19921 839
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would have likely accepted unlimited fifth freedom rights
and demanded only a price difference. If this had oc-
curred, international civil air transport after Bermuda
would have developed in a dramatically different manner.
